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L INTRODUCTION
Should an architect be liable when her mistakes increase a contrac-
tor's costs of construction? Should tort principles answer this question?
In a trend developing over the last two decades, an increasing number
of states' allow a contractor to sue the owner's architece in negligence
solely for economic loss' caused by defects in architectural plans or
specifications or by the architect's negligent performance of other tasks
during the course of a construction project.4 Contractors' negligence
* Associate Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. BA. 1984,
University of South Florida, J.D. 1987, Florida State University; LL.M. 1990, Columbia
University. I am grateful for a grant from the Mississippi College School of Law that
helped support the preparation of this Article.
See infra part IIA.
z "Contractor" refers to someone who enters into a contract with an owner to build
a project. The term "architect" refers to architects as well as engineers and any others
who perform similar services. Hence, "design professional" is an apt but cumbersome
synonym. 'Owner" refers to the entity that contracts with others to design and build the
project. "Owner's architect" means simply an architect under contract with the owner.
' These negligence suits seeking economic recovery are to be distinguished from
suits which also seek to recompense personal injury or property damage.
4 Courts often call these tasks "supervision." They can encompass virtually any
activity undertaken by the architect during the course of the project other than preparation
of the plans and specifications. However, "supervision!' can be misleading to the extent
that it implies a definite set of duties. In practice, an owner might hire an architect to do
any number of specific tasks during construction of the project, including some that
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claims5 against architects have become a routine part of construction
disputes and thus comprise a facet of the perceived tort liability crisis
confronting professionals. The significance of these negligence claims is
that although many jurisdictions generally bar negligence or products
liability suits unless the plaintiff has suffered personal injury or property
damage, contractors routinely recover purely economic loss in negligence
suits against architects. Thus, this Article examines a significant exception
to the economic loss rule."
Naturally, when faced with a loss, a contractor will embrace relief
from any available source. The important questions, however, are whether
the contractor should be afforded a remedy, ex ante, and, if so, whether
a tort action for negligence is the appropriate remedy. In confronting
these questions, this Article makes particular use of the two judicial
opinions that gave birth to the negligence action: United States ex rel. Los
Angeles Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers7 and A.R. Moyer, Inc.
v. Graham.8
involve overseeing or supervising the work of the contractor and some that do not.
Moreover, the division between supervision and design work is not always sharp, as when
an architect interprets plans or designs changes during the course of a project. What is
important to remember is that all such duties arise only from the contract between the
owner and the architect.
' Excluded from this paper are cases concerning an architect's liability as arbitrator
of disputes between the owner and the contractor. Based on an analogy to judicial
immunity, an architect is not liable for the adverse consequences of its decisions as
arbitrator, absent bad faith. See STEVN M. SIEGFRIED, INTRODUCHION TO CONSTRUCTION
LAW 137-38 (1987).
6 The economic loss rule, which is usually traced to Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927), refers to the prohibition against recovery in negligence
or products liability for purely economic loss, as distinguished from loss traced to
personal injury or property damage. Although many commentators have framed the issue
as whether tort doctrine should permit recovery for losses that are solely economic, the
problem defies a unitary solution. See Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort
Law: The Examples of J'Aire and of Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37, 38
(1986). But see William Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD I LEGAL STuD. 1
(1982); William Bishop & John Sutton, Efficiency and Justice in Tort Damages: The
Shortcomings of the Pecuniary Loss Rule, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 369 (1986); Robert L.
Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 1513, 1538 (1985); Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of
Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STum. 281, 283-85 (1982).
7 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958) [hereinafter Rogers & Rogers]; discussed infra
notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
' 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973) [hereinafter Moyer]; discussed infra notes 28-33 and
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The discussion proceeds as follows. Part II sets out the relevant cases.
Part II.A. outlines the approaches taken in Rogers & Rogers, Moyer, and
other cases allowing contractors to recover for economic loss in
negligence suits against architects.9  Part II.B. analyzes the
precedent-consisting mainly of personal injury cases-underlying the
decisions discussed in Part HA. and concludes that the precedent does
not compel recognition of a negligence action by contractors against
architects for economic injury." Part II.C. discusses a noteworthy
anomaly: some states that typically enforce the economic loss rule as a
general prohibition against negligence or products liability recovery for
purely economic injury exempt contractors who sue architects." Part
II.D. considers those judicial opinions that have rejected claims similar
to the ones presented in Rogers & Rogers and Moyer.'2 Part II.E.
concludes the preliminary examination of the cases by briefly sketching
contract remedies that present alternatives for redressing injuries such as
those alleged in Rogers & Rogers and Moyer.13
Part I generally discusses important problems with negligence
liability. Part I.A. illustrates how negligence liability provides unsatis-
factory incentives with regard to a contractor's delay damages and can
interfere with attempts to allocate the costs of delay by contract, as well
as how those contractual allocations may be more efficient. 4 Part HI.B.
demonstrates how imposing liability on the architect for negligent
performance of supervisory tasks set out in the contract between the
owner and the architect can reallocate risks that the parties had divided
by contract, thereby skewing multilateral contractual arrangements and,
essentially, forcing the parties to accept inefficient contract terms. Part
llI.C. discusses how negligence liability provides an undesirably vague
standard by which to judge the architect's performance.'6 Part llI.D.
addresses two common arguments in support of extending a negligence
remedy. Along the way, Part I examines key provisions of industry
form contracts in order to evaluate how these documents address the
issues. Part IV offers some concluding remarks on the redundant and
inferior nature of negligence principles in this context.
accompanying text.
'See infra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
* See infra notes 55-80 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
Is See infra notes 122-46 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
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II. THE CASES
A. The Negligence Approach
Courts which permit tort recovery for a contractor under a negligence
theory do so on the basis of a simple syllogism.
Privity of contract generally is not a bar to negligence recovery.
In prior cases, liability attached when negligence caused foreseeable
injury.
Therefore, when an architect's negligence foreseeably injures a
contractor, liability should attach.
This approach was developed in, and is aptly illustrated by, the two
leading cases permitting recovery for purely economic loss: United States
ex rel. Los Angeles Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers7 and A.R.
Moyer, Inc. v. Graham.8
17 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
"285 So. 2d 397 (Fla 1973). Moyer is the prominent authority in most states that
recognize the cause of action. See, e.g., E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 551
F.2d 1026, 1032 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978) (applying Alabama
law); Owen v. Dodd, 431 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (applying Mississippi
law); M.J. Womack, Inc. v. House of Representatives, 509 So. 2d 62, 72 (La. CL App.),
writ denied, 513 So. 2d 1208 (La.), writ denied, 513 So. 2d 1211 (La. 1987); Bacco
Constr. Co. v. American Celloid Co., 384 N.W.2d 427, 433 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986);
Magnolia Constr. Co. v. Mississippi Gulf S. Eng'rs, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1194, 1202 (Miss.
1988); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C. Morris Assocs., 418 A.2d 1290, 1291 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), affid, 489 A.2d 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). In
Confort & Eisele, the New Jersey Court noted that New Jersey has generally eliminated
privity as a bar to a negligence action and that recovery for personal injuries has already
been permitted. Consequently, "extending liability for economic injury [was] the next
logical step." Id. at 1292.
Other cases cite to both Moyer and Rogers & Rogers. See, e.g., Detweiler Bros. v.
John Graham & Co., 412 F. Supp 416, 419 (E.D. Wash. 1976) (relying on Moyer and
Rogers & Rogers in applying Washington law and holding that a subcontractor may sue
owner's architect for negligent supervision of construction); Forte Bros. v. National
Amusements, Inc., 525 A.2d 1301, 1303 (R.I. 1987); 1.0.1. Sys., Inc. v. City of Cleveland,
Texas, 615 S.W.2d 786, 790 ('rex. Civ. App. 1981) (finding no negligence on the facts);
Shoffner Indus. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 257 S.E.2d 50, 55-56 (N.C. Ct. App.), review
denied, 259 S.E.2d 301 (N.C. 1979). The Shoffner decision was premised largely on the
"well settled" North Carolina rule that "where a contract between two parties is intended
for the benefit of a third party, the latter may maintain an action in contract for its breach
or in tort if he had been injured as a result of its negligent performance." 257 S.E.2d at
55. The opinion is somewhat opaque, however, concerning the extent to which the
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In Rogers & Rogers, a building contractor named Rogers & Rogers
undertook to build a school through a contract with the United States. As
part of the construction process, the contractor fabricated the skeleton of
the building out of substandard concrete." When a local government
agency refused to approve the skeleton, which was required by law in
order for the school to be able to obtain a permit to open, the architect
ordered the contractor to stop work on the project and correct the
problem at the contractor's expense2
The contractor later sued the architect in tort to recover the cost of
replacing the skeleton and to recover delay damages.2 Essentially, the
contractor claimed that the architect performed certain "supervisory" tasks
negligently, the most notable one being the approval of the faulty
concrete.' The architect argued that the United States was the only
other party to the contract that imposed the supervisory duties and,
therefore, the United States was the only party to whom the architect
owed a legal duty.'
In response, the court employed the syllogism described above. First,
the court summarily noted that California no longer followed the common
law rule that only those in contractual privity may sue for the negligent
performance of a duty imposed by a contract. Then, drawing an
analogy to prior negligence cases imposing liability, the court decided
that the architect's control over the prime contractor ought to render the
architect liable.' The court found the following:
characterizations of the loss as property damage and of the architect's duties as
supervisory were necessary in allowing the suit. These characterizations were important
in the court's attempt to distinguish apparently contrary precedent from the North Carolina
Supreme Court.
19 The concrete was used to make bents, "pre-formed [truss-like] structures which
when hoisted into place to form the skeleton of the building." Rogers & Rogers, 161 F.
Supp. at 135.
2Id. at 134.
i Id. at 134. Procedurally, the testing laboratory and the concrete supplier sued the
contractor in the name of the United States in order to recover balances due them under
their contracts with the contractor. The contractor counterclaimed, adding the architect as
a party defendant. Id. at 133.
Id. at 135. Specifically, the contractor claimed that the architect negligently
interpreted reports of tests on the faulty concrete that were prepared by a testing company
that the architect had designated and the contractor had retained. The contractor also
claimed that the architect negligently approved the bents and negligently authorized or
ordered the bents to be incorporated into the building. Id.23Id.
2Aid.
2' Id. at 135-36.
1993-941
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[T]he architect was contractually obligated to the United States to
prepare plans and specifications for and supervise the construction of
the school building involved. This record further shows beyond dispute
that under the prime contractor's agreement with the Government the
architect had not only the general supervision and direction of the work,
but also the authority to stop the work whenever that might be
necessary to insure specified performance. 26
[The position and authority of a supervising architect are such that
he ought to labor under a duty to the prime contractor to supervise the
project with due care under the circumstances, even though his sole
contractual relationship is with the owner. ... Altogether too much
control over the contractor necessarily rests in the hands of the
supervising architect for him not to be placed under a duty imposed by
law to perform without negligence his functions as they affect the con-
tractor. The power of the architect to stop the work alone is tantamount
to a power of economic life or death over the contractor. It is only just
that such authority, exercised in such a relationship, carry commensurate
legal responsibility.27
In the other leading case, A. R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham,2 Moyer, a
prime contractor, sued Graham, the owner's architect, alleging negligent
preparation of plans and specifications and negligent performance of
various supervisory tasks." In allowing Moyer to recover on both
26 Id. at 134.
2' Id. at 134-36. The court continued:
The fact that the architect is retained by the United States makes no
difference. Indeed, this circumstance increases the need for exercise of due care
by the architect in his actions affecting the contractor, because the Government
usually is in an even stronger position than others to insist that the work be
done strictly according to specifications and that the contractor bow to the
supervision of the architect.
Id. at 136.
2 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).
Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 398. The case came before the Florida Supreme Court on
questions certified to it by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. A. R. Moyer, Inc. v.
Graham, 443 F.2d 434, 436 (5th Cir. 1971). The basic question asked by the Fifth Circuit
was whether a general contractor could maintain a direct action against an Architect or
Engineer where there was an absence of privity between the parties. The Fifth Circuit
further asked the Florida Supreme Court whether its opinion would differ if.
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negligence claims, 0 the court tracked the approach taken by the Rogers
& Rogers court.3' The Moyer court observed that in Florida privity is no
barrier to negligence recovery. Rather, the general rule in Florida is that
negligence causing foreseeable injury creates liability.32 Since the
architect could easily have foreseen the contractor's injury, general
negligence principles held the architect liable."
(a) The Architect or Engineer, or both, were negligent in the preparation of
the plans and specifications.
(b) The Architect or Engineer, or both, negligently caused delays in
preparation of corrected plans and specifications.
(c) The Architect or Engineer, or both, were negligent in preparing and
supervising corrected plans and specifications.
(d) The Architect or Engineer, or both, were negligent in failing and
refusing to provide the general contractor with final acceptance of the building
project in the form of an Architect Certificate upon the completion of the
building.
(e) The Architect or Engineer, or both, undertook to exercise control and
supervision over the general contractor in the performance of his duties to
construct the building project.
(f) The Architect or Engineer, or both, negligently exercised control and
supervision over the general contractor.
Id.
30 Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 402. The court expressly allowed actions for both negligent
design and negligent supervision, and for direct and delay damages. Id.
"' The Moyer court relied heavily and expressly on Rogers & Rogers. Id. at 401
(quoting Rogers & Rogers at length).
'2 Id. at 399.
Id. at 400. The Moyer court stated that "[ln our view the extent of [the architect's]
duty may best be defined by reference to the foreseeability of injwy consequent upon
breach of that duty." Id. (quoting Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply v. D.E. Britt, 168
So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 173 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1965)).
Arizona similarly defines liability in terms of foreseeability. In Donnelly Constr. Co.
v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984), the Arizona Supreme Court ruled
that liability exists whenever "both the plaintiff and the risk are foreseeable to a
reasonable person [and that] a broad view will be taken of the class of risks and the class
of victims that are foreseeable." Id. at 1295 (citations omitted) (relying in part on Rogers
& Rogers and Moyer); see also Doran-Maine, Inc. v. American Eng'g & Testing, Inc.,
608 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D. Me. 1985) (applying Maine law); Waldor Pump & Equip. Co.
V. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc., 386 N.W.2d 375, 377-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) ('The
reasonable skill and judgment expected of professionals [engineers in this case] must be
rendered to those who foreseeably rely upon the services.").
One commentator has explained the limiting of negligence liability to foreseeable
economic loss as an attempt to keep liability within proportionate limits. See Rabin, supra
note 6, at 1534. Hence, courts have extended liability in "triangular configurations" such
1993-94]
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In essence, Rogers & Rogers and Moyer allow a contractor to rely on
the architect's competence.' Under the reasoning of these decisions, a
contractor may undertake its work and rely on the architect to take
reasonable care in preparing the drawings and performing her other tasks.
Unsurprisingly, then, courts in some later decisions have protected the
contractor's reliance more explicitly, by defining the architect's tort
liability in terms of the contractor's reliance. Some courts have made
reliance the touchstone for a general negligence claim.35 Others have
as the relationships among owners, architects, and contractors, but have not extended
liability "to situations of widespread harm." Id.
The dissenting judge in Moyer would permit a contractor to sue an architect, but
only when the contractor relied on the architect and the architect knew of the reliance:
There may be factual situations which will support a contractor's or
engineer's claim against a negligent architect directly affecting such contractor
or engineer and under circumstances establishishing [sic] some reliance upon
the architect and the architect's knowledge of that reliance; but to extend
professional liability generally beyond the one who contracts, pays for and
receives and relies upon, that professional skill is a dangerous enlargement and
is unsound in my judgment. Such liability cannot be reasonably anticipated by
a professional when there is no privity between the parties; neither can he guard
against [liability] under this new hind-sight approach in the pursuit of tort
liability against him.
Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 403 (Dekle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"' For instance, in Forte Bros. v. National Amusements, Inc., 525 A.2d 1301 (R.I.
1987), the court allowed a contractor to sue the architect who had negligently calculated
the amount that the owner owed the contractor. The court found the crucial factor to be
the contractor's reasonable, foreseeable reliance. Id. at 1301-03. Interestingly, one justice
concurred based on
the well-settled general principle that ... a person who acts as an acknowl-
edged agent ... is independently liable for his own acts of negligence, despite
the fact that these acts are committed in the course and scope of the agency and
in furtherance of the disclosed principal's business.
Id. at 1304 (Kelleher, ., concurring) (citing Inter-Ocean (Free-Zone), Inc. v. Manaure
Lines, 615 F. Supp. 710, 715 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (finding stevedore liable as bailee of goods,
notwithstanding the stevedore's status as agent for the shipper)); see also Gateway
Erectors Div. v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 430 N.E.2d 20, 21 (III. App. Ct. 1981) (setting
forth the same agency principles). However, the agent cannot be liable in a breach of
contract case against the principal, even when the breach was the agent's wrongful
conduct. Forte Bros., 525 A.2d at 1304 (Kelleher, L, concurring); Inter-Ocean, 615 F.
Supp. at 715 (citations omitted).
The agency theory begs the question. The question is when should the architect be
deemed to commit a tort for which the architect is liable regardless of its status as agent.
Holding the agent independently liable in tort merely eliminates the cloak of immunity
enjoyed by an agent in contract cases.
For other cases that allow general negligence claims based on the plaintiff's reliance,
see McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, 410 N.W.2d 312, 314-315 (Minn. 1987)
ARcHnTCTS' LIABILrrY
imposed liability for negligent misrepresentation, usually following
section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' Often, courts have
(stating that Minnesota's economic loss rule only covers cases governed by the UCC);
Prichard Bros. v. The G-rady Co., 428 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 1988) (allowing a contractor
to sue architect for economic loss); Magnolia Constr. Co. v. Mississippi Gulf S. Eng'rs,
Inc., 518 So. 2d 1194, 1202 (Miss. 1988) ("Mississippi law allows third parties to rely
on a design professional's contractual obligation to the owner.') (citing Mayor of
Columbus, Mississippi v. Clark-Dietz and Assocs.-Eng'rs, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 610, 623-624
(N.D. Miss. 1982)); Nortrup Contracting, Inc. v. Village of Bergen, 527 N.Y.S.2d 670,
671-72 (Sup. CL 1986) (requiring privity .'or a relationship sufficiently intimate to be
equated with privity' for noncontractual recovery of purely economic loss from another's
agent (citation omitted)). The Northrup court allowed a contractor to sue the owner's
architect for erroneous plans and specifications and for negligent supervision because
'knowing and intended reliance upon the agent's work product is sufficient to create the
essential bond approaching privity which allows the imposition of noncontractual
liability." Id.; see also Mikropul Corp. v. Desimone & Chaplin-Airtech, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
940, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying the rule in Northrup to a suit by a prime contractor
against a construction manager based on the prime contractor's foreseeable reliance).
Nevada generally prohibits negligence suits for purely economic loss. However, in
considering contractors' claims against a city for failure to follow an ordinance requiring
payment bond on a project, the court in Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. City of Boulder,
797 P.2d 946, 953 (Nev. 1990), found this general prohibition to be inapplicable, since
"the purely economic recovery rule is bound up in foreseeability" and the contractors'
losses were easily foreseeable.
"6 For cases allowing negligent misrepresentation claims generally, see, for example,
Gulf Contracting v. Bibb County, 795 F.2d. 980, 982 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying Georgia
law) (contractor may sue architect under a Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 standard);
Malta Constr. Co. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson Inc., 694 F. Supp. 902, 906-07
(N.D. Ga. 1988); United States ex rel. Los Angeles Testing Lab. v. Rogers & Rogers, 161
F. Supp. 132, 136 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Donnelly Constr., 677 P.2d at 1296-97; Village of
Cross Keys, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 556 A.2d 1126, 1133 (Md. 1989)
(allowing a designer to be sued under a Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 standard for
faulty specifications); Page v. Frazier, 445 N.E.2d 148, 154 (Mass. 1983) (emphasizing
that the defendant must know that the plaintiff will be relying on the defendant's
services); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 222 N.E.2d 752, 755 (Mass. 1967) (finding an
engineer liable to a general contractor for negligently placed stakes, because "the identity
of the only possible plaintiff and the extent of his reliance were known to the defendant,
and [the] damages [we]re not remote"); National Sur. Corp. v. Malvaney, 72 So. 2d 424,
430-32 (Miss. 1954); Northrup Contracting, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 671-72 (finding that a
negligent misrepresentation action is available where the prime contractor's reliance is
"knowing and intended," even though general third-party negligence claims against
architects are prohibited by New York's economic loss rule); Davidson & Jones, Inc. v.
New Hanover, 255 S.E.2d 580, 585 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (finding an architect liable to
a general contractor for errors in the plans and specifications under a Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 552 standard); John Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d
428, 431 (Tenn. 1991) (allowing a subcontractor's suit against a construction manager
under a negligent misrepresentation theory that rested, in part, on Restatement (Second)
1993-94]
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recognized both a general negligence claim and a claim for negligent
misrepresentation as alternative avenues for recovery in a given case?7
In negligent misrepresentation cases, the prime contractor must show that
the damage resulted from its foreseeable reliance on a negligent misrepresen-
tation by the architect and, in states following section 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, that the architect knew of or intended the prime contrac-
tor's reliance. In relevant part, Restatement section 552 reads:
of Torts § 552); accord Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Util. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376,
394 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (under Iowa law, supervising engineer has a "duty of care and
competence commensurate with the standards of his profession in obtaining and
communicating information for the guidance of [a contractor] with respect to its business
transactions relating to the" project); Robert & Co. Assoc. v. Rhodes-Haverty Partnership,
300 S.E.2d 503, 504 (Ga. 1983) (finding an engineer liable to a subsequent purchaser
under a Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 standard); Ossining Free Sel. Dist. v.
Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91, 94-95 (N.Y. 1989) (allowing an owner's
negligent misrepresentation suit against the consulting engineer hired by the owner's
architect because the owner's known, intended reliance created a relationship between the
owner and the consultant which was "so close as to be the fictional equivalent of
contractual privity," as required by New York law). But see Floor Craft Floor Covering,
Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. Assoc., 560 N.E.2d 206, 213 (Ohio 1990) (rejecting
a claim that a negligent misrepresentation action should lie where a general negligence
claim could not).
17 See supra note 36. New York has attempted to put a tight reign on such negligent
misrepresentation cases. In Ossining Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 539
N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989), the owner sued a consulting engineer hired by the owner's
architect for negligent misrepresentation. The court posed the question as whether
"negligent misrepresentation cases, which produce only economic injury ... require[ ]
that the underlying relationship between the parties be one of contract or the bond
between them so close as to be the functional equivalent of contractual privity." Id at 91.
The New York approach differs from other states with regard to the rationale underlying
the rule: setting manageable bounds on liability. Id. at 93 (citing Rabin, supra note 6, and
relying heavily on Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236 (1922)). In finding that the owner's
intended reliance created the sufficient bond, the court applied the following three criteria:
(1) awareness that the reports were to be used for a particular purpose or
purposes;
(2) reliance by a known party or parties in furtherance of that purpose; and
(3) some conduct by the defendants linking them to the party or parties and
evincing defendant's understanding of their reliance.
Id. at 95 (citation omitted). Lower New York courts and federal courts applying New
York law have found the inquiry essentially the same for other construction-related
negligence claims for economic loss, but have been badly split as to the results reached.
E.g., Board Managers of the Astor Terrace Condominium v. Lichtenstein, 583 N.Y.S.2d
398 (App. Div. 1992) (finding negligence and attaching liability to the engineering and
design professionals); Lake Placid Club Attached Lodges v. Elizabethtown Lodges, 521
N.Y.S.2d 165 (App. Div. 1987) (finding no liability on behalf of the builder or architects
because there was no relationship approaching privity).
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Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employ-
ment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for
whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or
in a substantially similar transaction.'
Properly understood, the negligent misrepresentation cases are simply
a subset of the general negligence claims recognized in Rogers & Rogers
and Moyer. This subset simply excludes those cases in which the
architect'sfailure to act injured the contractor, such as when an architect
fails to approve timely a contractor's work and thereby prevents the
contractor from proceeding flrther"
When the architect misperforms a task, the issues are essentially the
same, whatever the rubric. For instance, it is difficult to see a difference
between the inquiry under section 552 and ordinary causation analysis.
If Rogers & Rogers had not relied on the architect's approval of the bents,
the architect's negligence would not have been the cause of the injury.
Even the feature which seems most to distinguish a negligent misrepre-
sentation claim from a general negligence action-the requirement of
Restatement section 552 that the architect knew of or intended the
contractor's reliance-adds little. Architects know that contractors rely on
a project's plans and specifications. Facts indicating that an architect
neither knew of nor intended the prime contractor's reliance should also
negate a negligence claim. For example, if the architect said to the
31 RESTATE ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
- See, e.g., Malta Consir. Co., 694 F. Supp. at 906-07. In Malta, the contractor's
claim against the architect for failure to review shop drawings promptly and adequately
was based on a failure to act, not on a misrepresentation, and was therefore not actionable
under a negligent misrepresentation theory. Consequently, the contractor's claim was
barred by Georgia's economic loss rle. Id.
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contractor in Rogers & Rogers that "the bents look good to me, but I'm
just guessing so you better check it out for yourself," the architect's
actions could hardly be said to have foreseeably to have caused the
injury. In other words, circumstances where the architect could not be
required to anticipate the prime contractor's reliance would also negate the
existence of a duty to use reasonable care to avoid foreseeable injury to
the contractor.
B. Not All Negligence Cases Are the Same
Rogers & Rogers and Moyer allowed a contractor's tort recovery of
pecuniary loss from a negligent architect because other cases had allowed
a plaintiff who was not a party to the contract to sue based on the
negligent performance of a contractual duty. Even assuming, however,
that those predicate cases were correctly decided, they do not compel the
results reached in Rogers & Rogers and Moyer.
The Rogers & Rogers court relied, without comment, on two
California negligence cases. One case, Biakanja v. Irving," held that a
notary who negligently drafted a will was liable in tort to the disappoint-
ed beneficiary.4' Biakanja, however, can be seen as a relatively simple
problem of standing to enforce contract rights." Had the testator
discovered the error before she died, she undoubtedly could have sued the
notary for breach of contract. The question, then, is whether someone
should be allowed to sue the notary in the testator's stead. The answer to
this question turns on whether the otherwise remediless Biakanja plaintiff
- 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
41 The Biakanja court stated that determining whether tort liability should exist absent
privity requires balancing the following factors:
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the
foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the
policy of preventing future harm.
Id. at 19. The Rogers & Rogers court found this formulation to be satisfied. United States
ex rel. Los Angeles Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 136 (S.D.
Cal. 1958); see also Note, Liability ofArchitects and Engineers to Third Parties: A New
Approach, 53 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 306, 319 (1977) (stating that tort liability should turn
on essentially the factors listed above).42 See Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability
Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 308-09 (1988) (suggesting that Biakanja and other
disappointed beneficiary cases could be treated under contract law, thereby eliminating
"confusing and misleading precedents" without altering the outcome).
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should be deemed a third-party beneficiary to the testator-notary contract.43
Rogers & Rogers, by contrast, had contract rights against the owner who, in
turn, had contract rights against the architect.L"
The other California negligence case on which the Rogers & Rogers
court relied is Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co!5 In Dow, three members of the
second family to live in a house died of asphyxiation when a heater installed
by the contractor malfunctioned. Finding the analogy to products liability
compelling, the court allowed the family to recover from the contractor. The
court stated that "building contractors will be treated like all other indepen-
dent contractors, manufacturers, and vendors in regard to negligently
manufactured products which cause injuries to persons not in privity of
contract.
'
""
But Dow, too, is distinguishable from Rogers & Rogers. There is a far
greater need for creating extracontractual solutions in personal injury cases,
such as Dow, than in construction disputes, such as Rogers & Rogers. One
cannot assume that the residents in Dow had satisfactory contract remedies
against the contractor 7 More importantly, one cannot assume generally that
persons, including homeowners, can adequately address potential personal
injuries by contract. On the other hand, Rogers & Rogers had a contract that
specifically included provisions defining its relationship with the architect"
and that, at least as a matter of law, allocated liability for potential economic
losses!9 One can assume that the parties to a construction project are
capable of addressing by contract the effects of architectural mistakes. Thus,
personal injury victims face barriers to contract solutions that contractors
confronting the potential results of an architect's actions do not face.5
43 See id. (suggesting that a disappointed beneficiary should be allowed to sue in
contract); see also Bishop & Sutton, supra note 6, at 359 (favoring third-party recovery).
'See infra part II.E.
4' 321 P.2d 736 (Cal. 1958).
" Id. at 740 (quoting Recent Decisions, 42 VA. L. REV. 391, 403-05 (1956)).
47 It is not at all clear that the Dow plaintiffs had sufficient warranty remedies that
were not barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, most personal injury victims will
have even less contractual connection with the person causing the injury than was present
in Dow.
48 United States ex rel. Los Angeles Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F.
Supp. 132, 134-35 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
49 See infra part II.E.
'0 The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this point. See East River S.S. Corp.
v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871-72 (1986) (discussed infra notes 66-77
and accompanying text); see also U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1993) (contract limitations for
personal injury recovery are unenforceable for consumer goods).
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Without tort liability, many personal injury victims would go uncompensated,
and those causing the injury would go underdeterred 1
The Moyer court likewise relied on personal injury cases.52 The court
reasoned that the policy behind holding those who produce defective products
liable for personal injuries dictates that negligent architects also be liable for
a contractor's increased expenses 3 As the Moyer court stated:
" Of course, this skirts the question of how much compensation for personal injuries
is appropriate. Cf. John E. Calfee & Paul H. Rubin, Some Implications of Damage
Payments for Nonpecuniary Loss, 21 L LEGAL STuD. 371, 402-03 (1992) (examining the
effects of compensation for nonpecuniary loss).
' The cases cited by the Moyer court include EFhlart v. Hummonds, 334 S.W.2d 869
(Ark. 1960) (wrongful death), Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351 (1963) (personal
injury), Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1973) (wrongful death), Mai Kai, Inc. v.
Colucci, 205 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1967) (personal injury), Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So.
2d 299 (Fla. 1956) (products liability suit for personal injuries), and Geer v. Bennett, 237
So. 2d 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (personal injury). The Moyer court also relied on
Willner v. Woodward, 109 S.E.2d 132 (Va. 1959), an ordinary breach of contract case
holding that an architect owed the owner a contractual duty to use reasonable care in
supervising construction, and Alexander v. Hammarberg, 230 P.2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App.
1951), a suit by homeowners against their architect for negligent supervision. Apparently
concerned with stare decisis, the court distinguished a title abstractor's case and an
accountant's case, both finding no tort duty to third parties, on the basis that an architect's
relationship with a contractor is different. A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397,
399-400 (Fla. 1973). How the relationship differs is not explained.
' Many other cases have likewise imposed liability by drawing an analogy to
products liability. See, e.g., Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292
(Ariz. 1984). Other cases have imposed liability or recognized a cause of action with little
or no comment, apparently assuming that negligence or products liability theories apply.
See, e.g., Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tnbe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d
315, 321-22 (10th Cir. 1982) (by implication); C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Glantz Contracting
Corp. of La, 322 F. Supp. 779, 784 (E.D. La. 1971) (applying Louisiana law, the court
recognized a negligence action by a contractor against the owner's architect without
discussion); Kellogg v. Pizza Oven, Inc., 402 P.2d 633, 636 (Colo. 1965) (without
discussion); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. GMR, Ltd., 499 A.2d 878, 883 (D.C. 1985) (by
implication); Ballenger Corp. v. Dresco Mechanical Contractors, 274 S.E.2d 786, 792 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1980) (by implication); Gurtler, Herbert and Co. v. Weyland Mach. Shop, 405
So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 1130 (La. 1982) (recognizing a
negligence action without discussion); Magnolia Constr. Co. v. Mississippi Gulf S. Eng'rs,
Inc., 518 So. 2d 1194, 1202 (Miss. 1988) (finding that duty, and therefore liability, can
arise from the conduct of supervising engineer); Engle Acoustic & Tile, Inc. v. Grenfell,
223 So. 2d 613, 620 (Miss. 1969) (by implication); State ex rel. Nat'l Sur. Corp. v.
Malvaney, 72 So. 2d 424, 430-32 (Miss. 1954) (finding an architect liable to surety for
negligently approving release of retainage); Vonasek v. Hirsch and Stevens, Inc., 221
N.W.2d 815, 823 (Wis. 1974) (allowing contractor to sue owner's architect for negligent
preparation of plans and specifications and negligent supervision of construction which
caused a joist to collapse, although no negligence was found on the facts).
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Privity is a theoretical device of the common law that recognizes
limitation of liability commensurate with compensation for contractual
acceptance of risk. The sharpness of its contours blurs when brought
into contact with modem concepts of tort liability. MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.... is heralded not so much for its decision on the facts as
for its precedential value: a case relaxing privity's strictures. In
Matthews v. Lawnlite Co.... th[is] Court recognized MacPherson as
humane and accepted its principle.'
With respect to the privity requirement, one state that has statutorily eliminated the
privity barrier is Mississippi. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1993) ("In all causes
of action for personal injury or property damage or economic loss brought on account of
negligence, strict liability or breach of warranty, including actions brought under the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, privity shall not be a requirement to
maintain said action."). Predictably, this statute has quieted any further debate over the
availability of a contractor's tort claim against an architect. See Owen v. Dodd, 431 F.
Supp. 1239, 1242 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (applying Mississippi law); DeVille Furniture Co.
v. Jesco, Inc., 423 So. 2d. 1337, 1342 (Miss. 1983).
A Georgia statute also speaks to the issue. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(a) (Michie
1982) reads:
Except as otherwise provided in this Code section, no privity is necessary
to support a tort action; but, if the tort results from the violation of a duty
which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to
the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party
would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract
In R.H. Macy & Co. v. Williams Tile & Tenazzo, 585 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D. Ga.
1984), a federal district court, applying Georgia law, considered this statute in denying
a subcontractor's suit against an architect based on faulty specifications. The court viewed
the issue as whether the architect owed a duty of care essentially by virtue of the
architect's status as a professional and concluded that there must be some "type of
professional relationship" between the subcontractor and the architect, or that their
relationship must .'approach[ ] that of privity."' Id. at 178-80 (citation omitted).
285 So. 2d at 399 (citations omitted). The role of products liability law and the
importance of foreseeability as the only limit on liability are evident in the principal
Florida case on which the Moyer court relied, Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply v. D.E.
Britt Assocs., 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), and which the court described
as "a natural extension of the Matthews case." Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 399. In Audane,
Britt, an architect, designed roof truss plans and specifications and sold them to Anchor
Lock, which was apparently a builder's supply vendor. Anchor Lock fabricated metal truss
plates and sold them, together with the plans and specifications, to Audlane. Audlane then
constructed the trusses using Anchor's plates and according to Britt's design. A contractor
purchased completed trusses from Audlane and incorporated them into a house. After the
trusses failed and Audlane paid for repairs, Audlane sued Britt in tort. Based on
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), the court found the injury
to be foreseeable and allowed recovery. Audane Lumber, 168 So. 2d at 335. The court,
however, rejected Audlane's implied warranty claim. Since a professional only warrants
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C. An Exception to the Economic Loss Rule?
In Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,55 the owner put a ship
in dry dock for scheduled repairs. During replacement of the ship's
damaged propeller, a dry dock employee allowed the replacement
propeller to fall, breaking a blade. The ship was out of service during the
two weeks that it took to have a new propeller cast and installed. The
ship was under charter at the time, and the charterer brought a contract
claim against the owner seeking to recover for loss of use of the ship.'
The court rejected the claim, finding that the owner did not breach the
charter.5
7
The charterer then sued the dry dock for the difference between the
rate of hire in its charter (which was suspended during the repair period
under the charter's cesser of hire clause) and the rate of hire in an existing
subcharter Upon reaching the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes rejected
the charterer's claim as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between
the owner and the dry dock and concluded that the charterer had no
property interest in the ship on which to base the suit." Justice Holmes
then rejected the charterer's negligence claim, citing a general rule that "a
tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor
liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract
with the other, unknown to the doer of the wrong."'
The holding in Robins has evolved into a modem, general prohibition
against tort recovery for economic loss.6" In its broadest formulation, the
"that he will or has exercised his skill according to a certain standard of care, [and] that
he acted reasonably and without neglect," the warranty claim merges into the negligence
claim. Id. Hence, "use of the term 'implied warranty' in these circumstances [would]
merely introduc[e] further confusion into an area of law where confusion abounds." Id.
275 U.S. 303 (1927) [hereinafter Robins].
5 Id. at 307.
The charterer's contract claim is reported in The Bjomeford, 271 F. 683, 684 (2d
Cir. 1921).
" Robins, 275 U.S. at 307. Due to the outbreak of World War I, the charterer, who
paid £ 1,200 per month for the use of the ship, was able to subcharter the ship for
£ 11,200 per month. See Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort:
Another Look at Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 20 1. LEGAL STUD. 249, 253 (1991).
"' Robins, 275 U.S. at 307-09.
60 Id. at 309.
6' A recent article has examined Robins in detail and concluded that resolving the
issues presented in that case does little toward resolving whether mere economic loss
should be compensable in other contexts. See Goldberg, supra note 58, at 275. Moreover,
as a matter of doctrine Robins could have remained confined to situations in which the
third party's interest was unknown or not foreseeable.
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economic loss rule prohibits tort recovery in negligence or products
liability "absent physical injury to a proprietary interest."' Under this
sweeping rule, recovery of economic loss is foreclosed when a producte3
or service 4 falls short of an expected level of quality yet causes no
personal injury or property damage.65
A recent admiralty products liability decision by the Supreme Court
exhaustively articulated the purposes underlying the economic loss rule.
In East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,' Ship-
building, a subsidiary of Seatrain, contracted for Transamerica Delaval to
design, manufacture, and install turbines in four supertankers that
Shipbuilding was under contract to build for four other subsidiaries of
Seatrain ' After construction, title to the tankers was transferred to a
company as trustee for the owner. The owner then leased the four tankers
under bareboat charters to four other subsidiaries of Seatrain." Bareboat
charters oblige the charterer to bear the costs of any repairs.69 Three of
the turbines were defective, while the other had been installed improper-
ly.7" Seatrain and its subsidiaries that were involved in the construction
of the ships sued Transamerica Delaval for breach of contract and breach
of warranty, but these claims were dismissed as barred by the statute of
limitations.71
The charterers sued Transamerica Delaval in negligence and products
liability to recover the cost of repairing the turbines and for income lost
' State of La. ex rel. Guste v. M.V. Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985)
(en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). This case involved a catastrophic collision
on the Mississippi River. The Fifth Circuit heard the case en bane in order to reconsider
the modem reach of Robins. Id. at 1021.
63 See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 875
(1986) [hereinafter East River].
6SeeRobins, 275 U.S. at 308; Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942 (11th Cir.
1982) (finding that Georgia's economic loss rule applies to professional services).
65 The minority view, which is that mere economic loss generally can be recovered
in a negligence action, is well illustrated by the California Supreme Court's decision in
J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979). In J'Aire, the owner of a building
leased space to a tenant who operated a restaurant. The owner hired a contractor to
renovate part of the building that lay entirely within the restaurant's leased space. Id. at
62. The court allowed the tenant to sue the contractor for purely economic loss when the
contractor's negligence allegedly caused the restaurant to lose business. Id. at 62-63.
"476 U.S. 858 (1986).
67 Id. at 859.
Id. at 859-60.
Id. at 860.
7' Id. at 860-61.
"' Id. at 861.
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during the period that turbine problems rendered the ships idle.' In
refusing to recognize these claims, the Court concluded that contract law
provided a more suitable framework for analysis:73
We realize that the damage [to the defective product] may be
qualitative, occurring through gradual deterioration or internal breakage.
Or it may be calamitous. But either way, since by definition no person
or other property is damaged, the resulting loss is purely economic.
Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt,
accident-like event, the resulting loss ... is essentially the failure of the
purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the core
concern of contract law.74
"The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not
arbitrary and does not rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in having an
accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an
understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must
undertake in distributing his products." When a product injures only
itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty [safety of persons and
property] are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual
remedies are strong.75
Contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited
to commercial controversies of the sort involved in this case because the
parties may set the terms of their own agreements. The manufacturer
can restrict its liability .... In exchange, the purchaser pays less for
the product. Since a commercial situation generally does not involve
large disparities in bargaining power, we see no reason to intrude into
the parties' allocation of the risk.76
Whatever the outer reaches of the economic loss rule, under Robins
and East River the core prohibition speaks to situations in which the loss
is confined to a small group who have addressed or can address the
matter through contractual arrangements. Yet, many states which enforce
7 Id.
' For a discussion of minority views, see id. at 868-70.
74 Id. at 870 (citations omitted).
75 Id. at 871 (citation omitted) (quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151
(Cal. 1965)).
76 Id. at 872-73 (citations omitted).
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a general prohibition against recovery of purely economic loss in
negligence or products liability nevertheless allow contractors to sue
architects for purely economic loss-a case seemingly within the core of
the prohibition.'
Florida, the Moyer jurisdiction; provides the defining example. The
Florida Supreme Court has squarely held that a buyer of services cannot
sue its seller in tort for purely economic loss7 8 and that a buyer cannot
sue its seller or a remote seller in tort for economic loss caused by
defective goods." Nevertheless, the court expressly exempted its earlier
decision in Moyer from these prohibitions, reasoning that "the supervisory
responsibilities vested in the architect carried with it a concurrent duty not
to injure foreseeable parties not beneficiaries of the contract. . .. Since
there was no contract under which the general contractor could recover
his loss, we concluded he did have a cause of action in tort."8
D. The Alternative Approach in Cases Rejecting Rogers & Rogers
and Moyer
Nearly all of the cases that reject Rogers & Rogers and Moyer do so
because they find that contract law provides a more suitable framework
for analyzing claims such as those presented in Rogers & Rogers and
Moyer." In specific doctrinal terms, courts have disallowed tort relief
' Compare Guardian Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378,
1385-86 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (allowing a Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 action,
even if Delaware law would otherwise bar a negligence suit for purely economic loss)
with Pierce Assocs. v. Nemours Found., 865 F.2d 530, 540-41 (3d Cir. 1988) (reaching
the contrary result under Delaware law), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989). See McCarthy
Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, 410 N.W.2d 312, 314-15 (Minn. 1987) (Minnesota's
economic loss rule only covers cases governed by the UCC); Prichard Bros. v. The Grady
Co., 428 N.W.2d 391, 392 (Minn. 1988) (allowing a contractor to sue an architect for
economic loss); accord Northrup Contracting v. Village of Bergen, 527 N.Y.S.2d 670,
671-72 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (stating that a negligence recovery for purely economic loss is
allowed under section 552, even if New York otherwise bars such recovery); John Martin
Co., Inc. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1991) (stating that although
Tennessee follows Robins generally, it had no application in a subcontractor's suit against
a construction manager for negligent misrepresentation).
n AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 180 (Fla. 1987).
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla.
1987).
to AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181. The court meant that there was no contract under
which the contractor could sue the architect. The court failed to discuss whether the
contractor could recover its loss by a contract claim against someone else, such as the
owner. See infra part II.E.
Si For instance, the dissent in Moyer took a similar approach-
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because a contractor's claim against an architect for increased construction
costs falls within the jurisdiction's general prohibition against negligence
recovery for purely economic lossY
"[Mlodem concepts" [of tort liability] are attained at the expense of
applicable standards; the desired result is attained by the juggling of differing
authorities in products liability and unrelated tort cases.
It is not difficult to rewrite the law if one sets out on a determined course
to depart from established precedent; what is difficult is to stand firm in support
of the sound principles of fumdamental law, against the onslaught of new and
novel theories asserted to provide economic relief to the present unfortunate
litigant, from some source which appears available to tap.
The liability of the architect should follow logical and mutually agreed or
reasonably implied lines of responsibility between contractor and architect,
within which framework an architect's failures can then be asserted in a proper
claim. Moreover, such claims can, of course, be pursued by the owner against
the architect where the contractor has successfully asserted the claim or defense
against the owner. ... Neglect to agree in advance on responsibilities or to take
available precautions should not be the basis for corrupting established and well
founded principles of liability.
A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 404 (Fla. 1973) (Dekle, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
' For example, in Jardel Enter. v. Triconsultants, Inc., 770 P.2d 1301, 1303-05
(Colo. Ct. App. 1988), an owner was not allowed to sue a subcontractor in tort because
the prime contract contained a liquidated damages provision, and the court viewed the
owner as an intended, creditor beneficiary of the subcontract. Id. at 1303. The court
viewed the rejection of the tort claim as one application of a general rule prohibiting
contract parties or beneficiaries from suing in tort for purely economic loss caused by the
breach of a contract duty. "A claim for economic loss on a contract should not be
translatable into a tort action in order to escape some roadblock to recovery on a contract
theory." Id. at 1304. Oddly, the court would seemingly take a different stance if the claim
could be shaped as one for negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 1305. Moreover, the Indiana
Supreme Court in Citizens Gas & Coke Util. v. American Economy Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d
998 (Ind. 1985), rejected a subsequent purchaser's claim against a contractor for property
damage. The court found that privity was a bar in products liability and contractor
liability suits except for cases "involving personal injury caused by a product or work in
a condition that was dangerously defective, inherently dangerous or imminently dangerous
such that it created a risk of imminent personal injury" ... based "on humanitarian
principles!' behind compensating personal injury victims. Id. at 1000.
See also, e.g., Malta Constr. Co. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson Inc., 694 F.
Supp. 902, 906-07 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (holding that a contractor may sue an architect for
negligent misrepresentation under a narrow exception to the economic loss rule which
applied only to the negligent supply of false information); Tusch Enter. v. Coffin, 740
P.2d 1022, 1026 (Idaho 1987) (finding a suit by a remote purchaser against the builder
was barred by the general Idaho rule that purely economic losses are not recoverable in
tort); State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 699 P.2d 1349, 1350 (Idaho 1984) (applying the rule
that purely economic losses are not recoverable in tort in an owner's suit against its prime
contractor); Nebraska Innkeepers v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 128
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Two Illinois opinions exemplify this approach. In Bates & Rogers
Construction Corp. v. North Shore Sanitary District,83 the court found
that the contractors' negligence action against the architect, which was
based on allegations of defective plans and negligent supervision, was
barred by the general Illinois rule against tort recovery for purely
economic loss. The court found that the contractors complained only of
defeated contract expectations, for which they had adequate contract and
warranty remedies.' As the court explained:
[TJhe damage suffered by the plaintiffs was to their "expectation
interest' that they would be able to successfully complete their
performance of the contract, and that the [owner, through its agent, the
architect/engineer] would not hinder them in the performance of their
contract, thereby allowing them to receive the full benefit of their
bargain with the [owner]. In our view, this is clearly an interest which
(Iowa 1984) (interpreting a prior case to allow a contractor to sue the owner's architect
only if the economic loss was "an integral part" of accompanying personal injury or
property damage); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., 859 F.2d 242, 248-49 (2d Cir.
1988) (dismissing a subcontractor's negligence claims against other subcontractors was
proper because of the lack of privity or some other relationship "so close as to be the
functional equivalent of contractual privity," which is required by New York law to
escape the general prohibition against tort recovery for purely economic loss); Widett v.
United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 815 F.2d 885, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that
absent privity, an architect was not liable in tort to subcontractors who detrimentally
relied on erroneous site plans because professionals are generally not liable in negligence
absent priviy); R.H. Macy & Co. v. Williams Tile & Terramo, 585 F. Supp. 175, 180
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (applying Georgia law, an architect owes no tort duty to a subcontractor
if there is "no indication that any type of professional relationship existed between [the
architect and the subcontractor] or that their relationship 'approaches that of privity.'
(citation omitted)); Council of Co-Owners v. Whiting-Tumer Contracting Co., 517 A.2d
336 (Md. 1986) (Maryland's highest court held that architects and contractors are liable
without regard to privity "to those persons foreseeably subjected to the risk of personal
injury because of a latent and unreasonably dangerous condition resulting from that
negligence." 517 A.2d at 338. Whether property damage would suffice was left an open
question. Id. at 344.); Key Int'l Mfg. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 536 N.Y.S.2d 792, 793-95
(App. Div. 1988) (holding that, absent privity, an owner cannot sue an architect or prime
contractor in negligence for purely economic loss given New York's general prohibition
against tort recovery in such cases); Carmania Corp., N.V. v. Hambrecht Terrell Int'l, 705
F. Supp. 936, 938-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (following Key Int'l in forbidding a tort suit by an
owner against its architect, since the damages sought "are of the type remediable in
contract" (citations omitted)); Dershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 396 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1990) (discussing the uncertain reach of the economic loss rule
in South Carolina in construction cases).
"471 N.E.2d 915 (11. Ct. App. 1984), a~fd, 486 N.E.2d 902 (I1. 1985).
4471 N.E.2d at 922.
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is meant to be protected by the law of contract since each party to a
construction contract impliedly warrants not to do anything to hinder the
performance of the other party.8 5
A subsequent Illinois Supreme Court opinion elaborated farther:
Because the question involved in [these cases] is one of dividing risks
and responsibilities among the participants in a commercial transaction
according to their intentions, rather than one of protecting persons and
property (including profits) from injury with rules that promote safety
and reasonable conduct, ... contract law [provides] the scale on which
to weigh the merits of [a contractor's] complaint.86
The Virginia Supreme Court's parallel analysis is also instructive. In
Blake Construction Co., Inc. v. Alley," the court concluded:
A duty to use ordinary care and skill is not imposed in the abstract.
It results from a conclusion that an interest entitled to protection will be
damaged if such care is not exercised. Traditionally, interests which
have been deemed entitled to protection in negligence have been related
to safety or freedom from physical harm. ... [W]here mere deteriora-
tion or loss of bargain is claimed, the concern is with a failure to meet
"' Id. at 924 (citation omitted); see also Fence Rail Dev. Corp. v. Nelson & Assoc.,
528 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ill. Ct. App.) (holding that builder was not entitled to award of
damages based on economic loss), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 401 (Il. 1988); Olfenburg
v. Hagemann, 512 N.E.2d 718, 723 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987), appeal denied, 520 N.E. 2d 387
(11. 1988) (finding that damages sought in third-party complaint for economic loss were
not recoverable in tort).
" Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 503 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Il. 1987)
(Simon, J., specially concurring). Anderson Electic involved an electrical subcontractor's
suit against the manufacturer of electrical devices who had agreed to supervise and
inspect the subcontractor's installation of its devices. Id. at 247. The court seemed to say
that adequate contract remedies existed, even if contract recovery is foreclosed in a given
case. A plaintiff seeking to recover purely economic losses due to defeated expectations
of a commercial bargain cannot recover in tort, regardless of the plaintiff's inability to
recover under an action in contract. Id. at 249. Nevertheless, it is unclear from the opinion
whether the rule would apply if the plaintiff truly had no remedy, as opposed to being
barred from pursuing a remedy that it had once had. Moreover, recovery is still available
under Illinois law where one "in the business of supplying information for the guidance
of others in their business transactions makes negligent misrepresentations." Id. (citing
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (Il. 1982)).
r 353 S.E.2d 724 (Va. 1987).
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some standard of quality. This standard of quality must be defined by
reference to that which the parties have agreed upon."8
Protection against economic losses caused by another's failure
properly to perform is but one provision the contractor may require in
striking his bargain.'
E. A Contractor's Contract Remedies
Unlike in most personal injury cases and many negligence cases
generally, in the context of an architect's negligence, tort law does not
provide the only plausible remedial scheme." Written contracts, often
of an extraordinarily complex nature, exist between the owner and the
contractor, and the owner and the architect. The most obvious remedial
alternative, then, is for the parties expressly to provide the contractor with
redress for damages caused by architectural error. For instance, the
contract between the owner and the contractor could explicitly allow the
contractor to sue the owner for problems caused by the architect, or the
contract between the owner and the architect could allow the contractor
to sue for the breach of any obligations contained therein. Another
alternative would be for the contract between the owner and the
contractor to assign some or all of the owner's rights against the architect
to the contractor."
" Id. at 726 (quoting Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1978)).
99 Id. at 727 (citations omitted); see also Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma
Community Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 560 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1990) (following the rationale of
Blake Construction). The Floor Craft court emphasized that the architect's obligations
were merely one feature of the various contractual undertakings on a construction project.
Id. at 209. In this context, the overriding need is to consider whether the liability at issue
was within the contemplation of the contracting parties. This need is poorly served by tort
law, because
[t]he controlling policy consideration underlying tort law is the safety of persons
and property-the protection of persons and property from losses resulting from
injury. The controlling policy consideration underlying the law of contracts is
the protection of expectations bargained for.
Id. at 211 (quoting Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Va.
1988)).
0 See, e.g., William Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of
Insurance, 14 1 LEGAL STUD. 242, 243 (1983) (stating that articulating agreements that
the parties would create themselves, if the terms were not too costly to negotiate, is a
principal feature of contract and tort law).
' Contracts produced by the American Institute of Architects expressly make the
architect a third party beneficiary to the provisions of the agreement between the owner
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Even if the parties fail to so provide, though, the law already provides
the contractor with contract remedies. First, the owner gives an implied
warranty that the plans and specifications are adequate.' Consequently,
the prime contractor can sue the owner for breach of this warranty and
recover expenses incurred as a result of erroneous architectural draw-
ings.93 Likewise, where contractor recovery is appropriate,94 a contrac-
tor has adequate contract remedies against the owner for damages caused
by an architect's misperformance of supervisory tasks.95 It is black letter
law that an owner is liable when an architect, acting as its agent with
regard to supervisory tasks, breaches some obligation in the owner's
agreement with the contractor." Two of the more significant contractual
and the contractor in the architect's favor, while simultaneously disclaiming any
contractual relationship between the architect and the contractor. AMERICAN INST. OF
ARCHrECrs, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction (Doc. No. A201),
Article 1.1.2 (13th ed. 1976), reprinted in 2 AmERICAN INST. OF ARCtmiECTS, HANDBOOK
OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1977) [hereinafter ALI General Conditions]. The AL4
General Conditions contain most of the important allocations of architectural error, and
have been described as
the most widely used construction contract document in the world today.
In 1989 alone, more than one million copies were sold. Countless others were
used or adapted for other purposes or contracts. Virtually every construction
contract drawn in the United States today either borrows language or concepts
from the AIA General Conditions.
Gregory W. Hummel, Construction Law Symposium Preface, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TR. L.J. 521 (1990).
92See United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137 (1918); see also S. Derstein,
Annotation, Construction Contractor's Liability to Contractor for Defects or Insifficiency
of Work Attributable to the Latter's Plans and Specifications, 6 A.L.R.3d 1394, 1397
(1966).
0 See Spearin, 248 U.S. at 137. Indeed, there is a well-developed body of contract
law governing the relative duties of the owner and the contractor as they relate to the
plans. Compare id. with, e.g., R.M. Hollingshead Corp. v. United States, Ill F. Supp.
285, 286 (Ct. CL 1953) (holding that a contractor cannot follow plans that the contractor
knows, before bidding, are defective and '!make a useless thing and charge the customer
for it"); Newsom v. United States, 676 F.2d 647, 649 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (stating that, in
bidding, contractor must question "patent ambiguitie[s]").
See infra part III.B.
9 In Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 117 (9th Cir. 1962), a suit for wrongful
termination of a prime contract, the court, applying Oregon law, saw ' no reason for
adding another remedy against architects, at least where the judgment against [the owner]
is not uncollectible. This rule, we think, applies whether [the] architects' actions were
intentional, negligent or merely erroneous."
9 Cf. Annotation, Liability of Contractee in Construction Contract for Delay
Resulting in Consequential Damages to the Contractor, 91 L.Ed. 48, 68 (1946); see
Bagwell Coatings, Inc. v. Middle S. Energy, Inc., 797 F.2d 1298, 1302-06 (5th Cir. 1986)
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obligations are the duty to cooperate with the contractor when coopera-
tion is necessary and the duty not to hinder the contractor's perfor-
mance.
97
III. CENTRAL PROBLEMS WITH NEGLIGENCE LIABILrrY
Thus far, it appears that a tort action in negligence is redundant in
light of a contractor's contract remedies. If this were the only problem,
one might conclude that this is no more than one of the law's inelegant
moments." However, negligence liability raises difficulties beyond a
lack of doctrinal purity. In several significant ways, the intrusion of tort
principles leads to inefficient and otherwise undesirable results. These
undesirable results would be less likely if the issues were instead resolved
by reference to contract law. Before examining these specific problems,
however, it is necessary to lay some groundwork.
To allow a contractor to recover in negligence from an architect is the
equivalent of including the following clause in the contracts between the
owner and the architect and between the owner and the contractor: "The
parties hereby agree that the architect shall be liable to the contractor
when the architect's negligence increases the contractor's costs of building
the project." Is this a contract term that rational owners, architects, and
contractors want?99
(finding that an agent was not liable for the owner's breach of a contract provision).
' See supra notes 95 and 96. If the architect's control over the contractor proves too
onerous and is in breach of the owner's contract with the contractor, the contractor need not wait
until the conclusion of the project to seek redress, even absent an express contractual
mechanism for resolving mid-job disputes. See SIEGFRIED, supra note 5, at 145-47. A material
breach entitles the nnbreaching party to terminate the contract and seek damages. Hence, the
court's concern in Rogers & Rogers with the architect's control, see supra note 27 and
accompanying text, is adequately addressed by contract principles. See infra part III.B.
"See Bishop & Sutton, supra note 6, at 358-59 ("If C [e.g., the architect] cannot be
sued by anyone, then the law is not efficient. But that is not the law since C can be sued
by B [e.g., the owner]. So A [e.g., the contractor] can enforce his claims by threatening
to sue B, who passes liability back to C. There is no harm in allowing A a direct suit in
tort against C, so long as C can plead any contractual defenses he might have against B,
such as terms exempting or limiting liability. Such combined contract and tort liability
is inelegant, but harmless. ). I would agree that C's ability to plead contractual defenses
goes a long way toward avoiding problems raised by the introduction of negligence
liability. See infra parts Ill-.A and C. It would not, however, eliminate all problems. See
infra part III.B.
' See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 90, at 243 (recognizing that a principal feature of
contract and tort law is the articulation of agreements that the parties would have created
themselves were the terms not too costly to negotiate).
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To answer this question, it is useful to view the architect as selling
the owner a package of services, which includes design work, other work,
and insurance (for the benefit of the owner and perhaps others) against
the inadequacy of her work."' Axiomatically, a rational owner will
want the architect to provide the insurance when the benefits exceed the
costs: that is, when it is in the interest, ex ante, of the owner as purchaser
of architectural services. It is in the owner's interest, ex ante, if before
contracting and without knowing whether a problem will arise, the owner
would want the architect to assume liability, knowing that in the long run
architects must cover their costs.
Likewise, a contractor can be viewed as selling the owner a package
of services that may include insurance against the inadequacy of
architectural work. If a contractor cannot recover for damages caused by
an architect's mistakes, the contractor will price that risk into its contract.
Again, a rational owner will want this insurance when the benefits exceed
the costs: when it is in the interest, ex ante, of the owner as purchaser of
construction services, knowing that in the long run contractors must cover
their costs, including harm caused by architectural error.
An owner must pay for architectural error one way or another: the
owner can either purchase insurance from the architect for the benefit of
the contractor, or the contractor can insure and charge the owner, or the
owner can self-insure and hold neither the contractor nor the architect
responsible. Owners who pay for the insurance surely want the cost of
that insurance minimized. Similarly, architects and contractors want the
cost kept as small as possible so that they do not suffer an unnecessary
increase in the price of their services.' In this way, efforts to minimize
the cost of insuring against architectural error work toward an efficient
result.10 2
In three notable instances discussed in the following sections,
negligence liability can frustrate efforts to minimize the cost of insuring
against architectural error.0 3 In evaluating these issues, consider this
'® See WMLAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIIC STRUCrURE OF
TORT LAW 66 (1987) (stating that insurance is an important component of liability).
101 Naturally, ex post, contractors want to recover damages and architects wish to
avoid paying damages. This is hardly the perspective, though, that ought to guide the
development of rules to govern behavior prospectively.
10 The result is efficient in an ex ante Pareto-superiority sense. That is, the ovners
can be made better off (by paying lower insurance premiums) and neither architects nor
prime contractors are made worse off. By definition, architects and prime contractors will
price the cost of whatever liability rule is chosen into their contracts and be fully
compensated.
" Viewed one way, these instances demonstrate the effects that varying the locus of
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phrasing ofa hypothetical contract provision imposing negligence liability
on the architect:
The contractor may rely on the architect to use reasonable care in
preparing the plans and specifications and undertaking the architect's
other duties set forth in the owner-architect contract. The architect shall
be liable to the contractor when the architect's failure to use reasonable
care increases the contractor's costs of building the project.'
A. Delay Damages
Negligence liability can frustrate efforts to minimize the cost of
insuring against architectural error because allowing a contractor to rely
on the owner's architect can give the contractor an insufficient incentive
to guard against certain potential damages, specifically, what are
commonly termed "delay damages." Stated differently, negligence
liability ignores the need for the contractor to take steps to reduce the
magnitude of harm that may flow from architectural error.'°
Suppose, for example, that a group decides to build a church and
enters into a design-build, fixed-fee contract with a firm. Under this
contract, a single firm agrees to take the project from beginning to end
for a stated price: it will work up a design for the project prepare the
plans and specifications, and construct the church. Assume further that the
firm will do all of the work with its own forces. By definition, then, costs
are fully internalized. The firm is completely responsible for architectural
(and all other) errors and works under the obvious need to minimize the
total cost of architectural mistakes during the life of the project. Because
the firm bears all such costs, the usual problems with placing incentives
in the right places are absent.
In the design-build example, assume the church sanctuary was to have
an elaborate skylight, to remind worshipers that they are always under
liability can have where transaction costs are positive. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1, 6-7 (1960); Harold Demsetz, Wealth Distribution
and the Ownership of Fights, 1 J. LEGAL STUn. 223, 224-29 (1972).
'" See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
105 Externalizing costs in this manner presents a common moral hazard problem. See
Bishop, supra note 90, at 247; see also Charles . Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L.
REV. 967, 970 (1983) (suggesting that the state should offer standard preformulated
contract options with known consequences, which would allow the parties to select the
legal obligations best suited to their situation).
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God's watchful eye. After the skylight was constructed, the firm realized
that the skylight materials specified by the firm's architectural division
were unsuitable, would leak, and thus had to be removed and replaced
with different materials. As a result, the following "direct" costs were
incurred: the labor to remove the old skylight materials, the replacement
materials, and the labor to install the new materials. In addition, the
unanticipated work occasioned by the error disrupted the construction
schedule and had "delay" effects. Interior work had to be put off during
the two weeks during which skylight repairs were underway, rendering
some workers and equipment idle. The project was finished late, creating
a need for workers to staff the project after it was to end, causing the
firm's next project to get off to a late start, and causing the firm to lose
business. The price of some materials rose, and overhead costs, such as
financing, also increased."0 6
'o6 See Suemik Company, Ltd., CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIM SEMINAR MANUAL
(1986), which contains materials targeted to a national audience of construction lawyers.
This source describes the following common elements of delay damages claims:
[a] "Extended general conditions." These include "personnel costs for
project managers and other similar project administrative personnel; costs of
additional utility charges for heat, light, and water;, additional costs for
maintenance; additional costs for facilities such as temporary storage facilities
or office trailers; communications charges; and additional security charges." Id.
at 79.
[b] "Home office overhead." During a period of delay, "fixed overhead and
general and administrative expenses will continue to be incurred, but there will
be a reduced amount of direct costs to which these expenses can be charged.
The result is an amount of overhead that is 'unabsorbed' and which can be said
to be attributable to the delay." Id. at 85.
[c] "Idle labor and equipment." Id. at 91.
[d] "Reduced productivity." Delay '"reduce[s] the productivity of a
contractor's labor and equipment. The lost productivity may take the form of
reduced efficiency due to reduced production or working during adverse
weather conditions." Id. at 92.
[e] "Escalation." This includes "[c]ost increases due to work performed in
a later period than anticipated ... [such as] increased rates for material, labor,
or equipment." Id. at 101.
[f] Other costs, including lost opportunity, cost of experts to prove the delay
claim, lost investment capital, testing and laboratory costs, lost revenue, lost
reputation, and interest on retainage money held by the owner. Id. at 102.
[g] "Increased costs due to acceleration." Id. at 102. This can include the
need to "hire additional men, work overtime, accelerate material delivery
schedules, add additional supervision, and use additional equipment." Id. at 135.
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In advance of the design problem, how would the design-build firm
confront these potential costs? Consider first the delay costs. A disruption
in the project's schedule (whatever the cause) can strain a firm's
productive capacity in one of two ways: first, by creating idleness during
the period of delay and, second, by requiring work to be performed at an
unscheduled time. Essentially, a delay claimant argues that she was
damaged because she could not perform work when she had planned on
performing it. Consequently, the impact of delay can be moderated by
reducing reliance on a delay-free job. In other words, the firm can
decrease potential delay damages by retaining more flexibility in its
general productive capacity.1"7
Now, contrast the direct costs. By definition, the work occasioned by
the problem at hand was unanticipated. The firm must purchase more
materials and employ additional labor to perform the unanticipated work.
It is important to recognize that other than avoiding the mistake in the
first place, a firm can do little to reduce these costs. Reducing reliance on
the description of the project would be quite difficult for a firm. Stated
differently, it is impractical for a firm to retain much flexibility concern-
ing most particulars of the project that it is to build. To anticipate just
what extra material and labor might be needed would be a complex
undertaking, and much of the cost must be incurred anyway. There may
be little savings and much waste in stocking specialized materials and
labor in anticipation of extra work.
Although a firm cannot anticipate which errors will occur, it can
expect problems occasioned by architectural mistakes to arise. Without
knowing what the mistakes will be, some consequential costs--the costs
which are more particular and mistake or project specific-cannot be
reduced significantly, while other consequential costs-the more gener-
al-can be. The point to be made is that many delay costs fall into the
latter category.
While a firm must rely on the description of a project, no firm relies
on a delay-free job. A contractor always anticipates some delay. Suppliers
inevitably supply late; equipment is not always up and running; all
workers are not well and able all days; the weather is not always
See also Bates & Rogers Constr. Corp. v. Greeley & Hansen, 486 N.E.2d 902, 905-06
(II. 1985) (detailing the elements of a delay damages claim).
In addition to the reasons discussed in the text, it may be desirable to avoid delay
damage claims because the governing legal standards are so vague as to invite contractors
to press questionable claims. See infra part III.C.
,o The possible elements of a delay damages claim described supra note 106 illustrate
that delay damages relate to strains on the firm's general productive capacity.
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accommodating. Thus, a contractor must always maintain some flexibility
in its productive capacity and in a project's schedule.
Notably, parties generally place much of the risk of delay on the
contractor, which suggests that the costs of delay can be effectively
reduced by the contractor. For instance, a typical contract provides that
a force majure that delays the project entitles the contractor to a
corresponding extension of time, but to no other relief.10 8 Such a clause
relieves the contractor from liability to the owner for a late job"a but
does not allow the contractor to pass its delay costs to the owner. Also
common are "no damage for delay" clauses, under which the contractor
cannot recover for a delay caused by the owner." ' Under these contract
provisions, a contractor knows it must be able to absorb idleness and
have the capacity to finish a prolonged project. A contractor can offer a
lower price if such clauses are omitted and the owner agrees to under-
write the expenses of delay. Such arrangements suggest, therefore, that
requiring the contractor to absorb delay expenses costs the owner
less."' Design error is just one cause of delay. Incentives to avoid delay
10 See, e.g., ALl General Conditions, supra note 91, at Article 8.3.1.
"0 This allocation of risk touches on the parallel question of how best to reduce the
cost of insuring against delay damages suffered by the owner.
0 A typical "no damage for delay clause" reads:
Should the Contractor be delayed in the commencement, prosecution or
completion of the Work by the act, omission, neglect or default of the
[Architect,] Manager, Owner and/or of anyone employed by the [Architect,]
Manager, Owner, or of any other contractor or subcontractor on the Project, or
by any damage caused by fire or other casualty ... then the Contractor shall
be entitled to an extension of the time only, such extension to be for a period
equivalent to the time lost ....
John E. Green Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Turner Constr. Co., 500 F. Supp. 910, 911
(E.D. Mich. 1980). For several alternative formulations, see SIEGFRE D, supra note 5, at
39, 150, 236. See also Comment, The Enforceability of "No Damage for Delay" Clauses
in Construction Contracts, 28 LoY. L. REV. 129, 129 n.3 (1982).
.. Even so, owners must determine how much delay a prime contractor should be
required to absorb. Maintaining flexible productive capacity comes at some expense; the
more flexible, the more expensive. No doubt owners will not want to pay contractors to
maintain absolutely flexible productive capacity. For instance, the owner may not want
the contractor to retain the flexibility necessary in order to be able to cope with remote
but catastrophic events. See Victor P. Goldberg, Impossibility and Related Excuses, 144
J. INST. AND THEOR. ECON. 100 (1988), reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
TORT LAW at 221-24 (Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1989); Richard A. Posner & Andrew M.
Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
Courts have dealt with this issue by refusing to enforce a no damage for delay clause
in certain circumstances. See, e.g., E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Texas,
[Vol. 82
ARCHITECTS' LIABILITY
aside, there is no reason to treat delay caused by an architect's error
differently from delay created by unusually heavy and frequent thunder-
storms.
Creating the right incentives in order to avoid errors that cause delay
is important. Delay is costly, and in the long run owners must also pay
for these delays in terms of increased costs."' To allow the contractor
to recover delay damages does not provide the contractor with any
incentive to reduce them. However, to require the contractor to absorb the
costs of delay caused by architectural error may give the architect too
little incentive to take care."'
Confronting an architect with the consequences of sloppy work in
ways other than liability for a contractor's delay damages may be a
possibility. Substantial, albeit imperfect, incentives are likely to exist.
First, liability for the other "direct" costs, like the labor and material to
replace the skylight in the preceding example, can provide an important
incentive. Second, the architect might face liability for the owner's delay
damages, perhaps in a liquidated amount."' If architects are liable for
such costs, sloppy architects will pay higher insurance premiums and thus
be at a competitive disadvantage.
The architect's reputation may also provide substantial incentives. An
architect known for shoddy work cannot charge as much for its services.
Viewed one way, an architectural firm engages in activities in order to
enhance the value of its brand name and then rents the brand name with
its services to owners."5 If an architectural firm tarnishes its reputation,
551 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir. 1977). "[C]ourts will ... generally enforce [clauses
relieving one party from damages for delay caused by that party] absent delay (1) not
contemplated by the parties under the provision, (2) amounting to an abandonment of the
contact, (3) caused by bad faith, or (4) amounting to active interference." Id.; see also
Comment, The Enforceability of "No Damage for Delay" Clauses in Construction
Contracts, supra note 110, at 131. This doctrinal formulation thus addresses problems of
both adverse selection and moral hazard. See Bishop, supra note 90, at 246, 252-54.
.1. Ideally, but perhaps impractically, the contractor could reduce potential delay
damages to their minimum, quantify and identify them in the contracts, and hold the
architect liable for that amount. Such an approach has other advantages: it aids planning
and eliminates any need to determine (or argue about) the actual cost of delay. See, e.g.,
Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Properly: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 27 (1985).
"' See Bishop, supra note 90, at 261-64 (suggesting that in order to eliminate this
moral hazard problem, legal doctrine ought to require care by the party who suffers a
loss).
"" For instance, if the project is to be leased to a third party on completion, the
architect might be liable for any penalties in the lease tied to late delivery of the building.
' See Goldberg, supra note 42, at 302.
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the value of its brand name is reduced, and its future revenues will
decline' 16
The extent to which the architect's reputation will serve as a check on
substandard work depends on the quality and availability of information
regarding the architect's past performance. If information were typically
poor or seldom available, the incentive to work carefully would decline
and an adverse selection problem might develop: firms that spent
resources to enhance the value of their brand names would be at a
competitive disadvantage because they would increase their operating
costs without realizing a commensurate return. However, information in
the market may be good. Some owners will be repeat players, as will
many lenders, construction managers, contractors, and performance bond
sureties." 7
In the end, a sensible owner could decide that to provide the
contractor with an incentive to reduce delay damages is more important
than to provide the architect with an extra incentive to avoid causing
delay. A sensible owner could also, however, conceivably decide the
opposite. No doubt the decision will vary from relationship to relationship
and from project to project, or even from phase to phase within a project.
The central point is this: the variable and contingent nature of these issues
illustrates precisely why contract principles are better suited than tort
principles for resolving them.
Forms provided by the American Institute of Architects ("AIA")
apparently reflect the judgment that it is more important to give the
architect an incentive to take sufficient care than it is to give the
contractor an incentive to reduce potential delay damages."' The AIA
contract forms entitle the contractor to an extension of the contract time
to perform the work if delayed by any act of the owner or the owner's
architect."" Importantly, the contractor may also sue the owner, or
anyone else, for delay damages.'
Recognition of a tort action in negligence can frustrate efforts to
resolve these problems by contract. Indeed, it is tempting to speculate that
116 Id.
11 Id. at 303.
n8 The term "apparently" is used because perhaps the AIA forms reflect the judgment
that a contractor's waiver of tort claims against the architect will not necessarily be
enforced and is therefore not worth the reduction in architectural fees that owners might
demand if such a provision were included. Moreover, the AIA documents have gone to
great lengths to reduce the likelihood that architects will be held liable for any damages
under a theory of negligent supervision. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
119 AI General Conditions, supra note 91, at Article 8.3.1.
12 Id.
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tort remedies are often pursued precisely in an effort to avoid a recovery-
limiting contract provision, such as a "no damage for delay" clause.'
B. Reliance on the Architect's Supervision
Another problem with negligence liability is that a court-imposed
provision allowing the contractor to rely on the architect can embody a
misperception of the nature of many supervisory tasks set forth in the
owner-architect contract. To decide that the contractor can rely on the
architect to perform a certain task with due care is equivalent to a
contract term which requires the architect not the contractor, to perform
the task. Tort law simply has no place in deciding which tasks ought to
be assigned to the architect and which should be assigned to the
contractor. Rather, the question should be which tasks did the contracts
assign to which parties." Thus, without regard to the problem of delay
damages, negligence liability is also problematic because it can allow the
contractor to rely on the architect in circumstances where the parties
agree (or would agree) that the contractor should rely on itself.
The application of negligence principles may often reach the wrong
result by concluding, essentially, that the parties have assigned a task to
the architect when, in fact they have assigned it to the contractor.
Consider the fact that an owner may have various reasons to police the
contractor. Some deviations are difficult to detect in the finished job.123
Moreover, remedying faults in a completed'job can be too expensive to
justify. Tearing down a completed building worth $5 million in order to
remedy a defect that decreases its worth by $1 million constitutes waste.
The law does not require the contractor to remedy such defects, yet,
presumably, the owner would rather have the building built as planned.
than receive a $1 million damage payment.' 4 Even when a contractor
' See William K. Jones, Economic Losses Caused By Construction Deficiencies: The
Competing Regimes of Contract and Tort, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1051, 1097 (1991)
(suggesting that this is the probable motivation).
2 But cf Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract-Based Approach, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1075, 1102 (1979) ("Once the parties' obligations and expectations are determined
[by reference to the contract obligations and standards of care], a tort analysis may be
constructed-the scope of the architect's duty to act being determined by reference to the
contract and its modification by conduct, the foreseeability of injury depending on the
reasonableness of the plaintiffs reliance on the architect's performance.").
1 In the same vein, the owner will want to make sure that the contractor is
performing the work for which he receives progress payments during the course of the
project.
124 See W.M. Moldoff, Annotation, Cost of Correction or Completion, or Difference
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is required to correct his mistakes, owners may hesitate to rely too
heavily on a member of a group notorious for thin capitalization,
particularly given the specter of premises liability.s Thus, the owner
has a significant need for someone other than the contractor to inspect
ongoing work. An obvious choice is the architect, who is already familiar
with the plans and specifications and who historically has filled this role.
Inspections undertaken to police the contractor, however, are not
intended to substitute for the contractor's duty to ensure that the project
is built in compliance with the plans and specifications. Such inspections
may well be superficial. Even when an architect's inspections are more
detailed, to allow the contractor to recover from the architect is problem-
atic in that it dan create a conflict of interest between the owner and the
architect.
The owner has hired the architect to protect its interests by inspecting
the work, yet negligence law can step in to require the architect to
consider the interests of the contractor, perhaps to the detriment of the
owner's interests. 6 Moreover, to relieve the contractor of its obligation
to comply with the plans by allowing it to rely on the architect's
assessment of its work may simply effect a transfer of wealth from the
architect to the contractor.127 If the contractor is contractually obligated
to rely on itself, the owner realizes no savings when the law permits the
contractor to rely on the architect. Ex ante, the owner already compensat-
ed the contractor for undertaking the work.128
in Value, as Measure of Damages for Breach of Construction Contract, 76 A.L.R.2d 805
(1961) (collecting cases that delineate circumstances where the owner cannot insist on
strict compliance with the plans and specifications but must instead accept deviations if
economic waste would otherwise result).
I" "Historically, the liability of a possessor of land to one injured thereon was
treated as a branch of tort law, or more specifically, in the context of
negligence. However, as the amount of litigation ... has increased exponential-
ly, there has developed a separate branch of the law, sometimes referred to as
'landowner's and occupier's liability,' or more generally 'premises liability,'
which particularizes the rules applicable to injuries occurring on the property
of the owner or occupant-that is, on his premises."
62 Am. JUR. 2d Premises Liability § 1 (1990). Hence, even a contractor's performance
bond may be inadequate financial protection.
126 See Jones, supra note 121, at 1094-96. But see Bagwell Coatings, Inc. v. Middle
S. Energy, Inc., 797 F.2d 1298, 1309-12 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that an agent must
breach some contract obligation to the owner before the agent is liable to a third party for
negligence).
127 At the least, the contractor is given the benefit of insurance against the inadequacy
of the work.
1 Moreover, on the next job, an architect will price the risk of liability into its
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The problems raised by the intrusion of tort principles are particularly
acute in cases alleging negligent supervision. Consider again the Rogers
& Rogers 1 9 case and the architect who approved defective concrete that
was then incorporated into the skeleton of the building.13 The contrac-
tor was allowed to bring a negligence action against the architect to
recover the costs of replacing the skeleton and to recover delay damag-
es.' An examination of these facts under contract principles either
leads to a superior remedy for the contractor or demonstrates that the case
was wrongly decided.
Assume that the contract documents in Rogers & Rogers made clear
that the architect was required to interpret tests of the concrete and decide
whether the concrete met the contract specifications." If that were true,
then the question should be whether the parties intended the contractor to
rely on the architect or whether the parties also intended the contractor
to satisfy itself that the concrete met contract specifications." In other
contract with the owner. Even if the owner can then extract some savings from its
contractor, the owner is compelled to purchase services or insurance from the architect
that it did not otherwise want. See Jones, supra note 121, at 1096.
12 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
1 See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
3 Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 136.
132 Id. at 134-36.
m A Texas intermediate appellate court sharply criticized both Rogers & Rogers and
Moyer for ignoring the architects' contractual roles in finding a general duty based on the
architects' supervisory power.
The sum and substance of [the criticized position is]:
All architects control the work of the contractor, [the defendant] is an
architect; therefore, [the defendant] controlled the contractor's work ....
From the control so deduced, [plaintiff] urges this Court to make the legal
determination that a duty should be placed upon [the defendant] and architects
generally, based perhaps upon ... social, economic, and moral grounds ....
... [But] [a]ny such rule of general application, based upon an assumed
general control of the architect over the contractor, must invariably result in an
injustice in a particular case when the contract assigns no control to the
architect with respect to a particular aspect of the contractor's work wherein the
injury occurs, but the architect is, nevertheless, held to a general duty said to
be founded upon and justified by the existence of his power over the contractor.
... [Even where the architect is given such power by contract,] the bedrock
questions remain: did the contracting parties assign such plenary power to the
architect for the benefit of the owner only or for both contracting parties; or,
should a duty of care be imposed upon the architect in favor of the contractor
notwithstanding the intentions of the contracting parties?
Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental Constructors, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365, 373-74 (Tex.
CL App. 1982). Nevertheless, the Texas court left open the possibility that some owner-
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words, the question is whether the parties intended for the architect's duty
to decide whether the concrete met the contract specifications to
supersede the contractor's duty to supply satisfactory concrete."
Negligence liability represents a judgment that it was the architect's, not
the contractor's, ultimate responsibility to perform the given task. If the
inquiry is squarely within the regime of contract, however, the question
should be decided according to the intent of the parties and principally by
reference to the contract documents and the course of conduct. As the
foregoing discussion illustrates, the answer to this question may be more
difficult than courts have traditionally recognized and may be contrary to
the conclusions that courts have reached under negligence principles.
If the parties intended for the architect's duty to supersede the
contractor's, then contract law relieves the contractor of liability for the
architect's mistake. Indeed, contract law gives the contractor a remedy
superior to the tort remedy in Rogers & Rogers. When the contractor
constructed the skeleton in accordance with the architect's approval, the
contractor satisfied its contractual duty. When the contractor performs
additional remedial work, it is entitled to be paid for that work, regardless
of whether the architect's erroneous approval was negligent or occurred
despite the utmost care.
If, on the other hand, the parties did not intend for the contractor to
rely on the architect, then Rogers & Rogers was wrongly decided. If the
contractor decides to take a chance and rely on someone to perform its
contractual duties, it should do so at its own risk."
Interestingly, if one reverses the Rogers & Rogers facts and considers
the case where the architect erroneously rejects the concrete, tort and
contract law converge. Whether or not the parties intended the architect's
duty to supersede the contractor's, the contractor would have a breach of
architect contracts could give rise to a tort duty in favor of the prime contractor. Id. at
375.
Of course, imposition of such a general duty of careful supervision exaggerates the
problems with negligence liability discussed in this section. In most cases, however, it is
clear that the architect is held liable only for misperforming those supervisory duties set
forth in the contract between the owner and the architect. Id. at 374. Although the
architect's control has been a reason why courts have imposed liability for misperforming
those supervisory tasks that the architect has contracted to do, it appears that presumed
control has not been used to extend an architect's general duty to supervise. Id.
13 See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text for reasons why the owner may not
want the architect's duties to supersede the contractor's responsibilities, despite the
increased costs of such dual obligations.
135 Compare AM4 General Conditions, supra note 91, at Article 4.12.6 (The Contractor shall
notbe relieved from responsibility for errors and omissions by the Architect's approval thereof.).
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contract action. By definition, the contractor would have satisfied its duty
to perform the work according to the specifications. When the architect
wrongly rejects the work, the architect has breached the owner's duty not
to hinder the performance of the contractor.'36 Thus, when the contrac-
tor performs additional work, it is entitled to be paid for that work.1"7
Contractor recovery in the wrongful rejection case raises the conflict
of interest problem mentioned earlier." The owner's interest requires
the architect to err on the side of avoiding wrongful approval; the
contractor's interest requires the architect to err on the side of avoiding
wrongful rejection. There is no simple (or costless) way to avoid this
conflict of interest. Foreclosing contractor recovery would require the
contractor to insure against wrongful rejection, an event over which the
contractor lacks direct control. Nonetheless, however this dilemma should
be resolved, contract rather than tort principles provide a framework
within which the owner can confront the problem.
The AIA forms give the architect a minimal supervisory role
consistent with a policing function. The architect's authority to act on
behalf of the owner is limited only to specifically listed duties,"' and
the architect's duty to inspect ongoing construction is quite general. 4'
16 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. This analysis assumes that the
architect is acting as the owner's agent and not as an independent arbitrator of disputes
between the owner and the contractor. See Bagwell Coatings, Inc. v. Middle S. Energy,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1298, 1311 n.19 (5th Cir. 1986); see also supra note 5 (regarding a clause
requiring cooperation from owner).
137 Although the contractor must show that the architect should have approved the
work in order to recover damages, the architect may be held to a higher standard of
performance than ordinary care. See infra part III.C.
131 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
'3 ALA General Conditions, supra note 91, at Article 2.2.2.
"40 Id. at Article 2.2.3. Moreover, the architect's duty to take action on the prime
contractor's submittals is limited to "conformance with the design concept." Id. at Article
2.2.14. Indeed, the prime contractor is relieved of responsibility for deviation from the
plans and specifications of work submitted to and approved of by the architect only if the
prime contractor specifically informs "the Architect in writing of such deviation at the
time of submission and the Architect has given written approval to the specific
deviation[s]. [However,] [t]he Contractor shall not be relieved from responsibility for
errors or omissions ... by the Architect's approval thereof." Id. at Article 4.12.6.
This level of responsibility applies to the architect's certification of the prime
contractor's applications for progress payments. See Article 9A.2. Indeed, by issuing a
certificate for payment, the architect represents only that the certificate is consistent with
the Article 2.2.3 site observations. Once again, significant inspection by the architect is
disclaimed.
[B]y issuing a Certificate for Payment, the Architect shall not thereby be
deemed to represent that he has made exhaustive or continuous on-site
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The Architect will visit the site at intervals appropriate to the stage
of construction to familiarize himself generally with the progress and
quality of the Work and to determine in general if the Work is
proceeding in accordance with the Contract Documents. However, the
Architect will not be required to make exhaustive or continuous on-site
inspections to check the quality or quantity of the Work. On the basis
of his on-site observations as an architect, he will keep the Owner
informed of the progress of the Work, and will endeavor to guard the
Owner against defects and deficiencies in the Work of the Contrac-
tor1
41
Further, the AIA contracts disclaim any responsibility on the part of
the architect for the work,42 including responsibility arising from the
architect's right to reject work' 43 Concurrently, the prime contractor
remains expressly liable for work that fails to conform to the plans or
specifications, no matter what the architect does in performing the
supervisory tasks set forth in the contract:' 44
The Contractor shall not be relieved from his obligations to perform
the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents either by the
activities or duties of the Architect in his administration of the Contract,
inspections to check the quality or quantity of the Work or that he has reviewed
the construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures.
Id. at Article 9.4.2.
141 Id. at Article 2.2.3.
'4 Id. at Article 2.2.4. Again the language is quite broad-
The Architect will not be responsible for and will not have control or
charge of construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, or
for safety precautions and programs in connection with the Work, and he will
not be responsible for the Contractor's failure to carry out the Work in
accordance with the Contract Documents. The architect will not be responsible
for or have control or charge over the acts or omissions of the Contractor,
Subcontractors, or any of their agents or employees, or any other persons
performing any of the Work.
Id.
143 Id. at Article 2.2.13, which states that no decision by the architect "to exercise or
not to exercise [the] authority [to reject work] shall give rise to any duty or responsibility
of the Architect to the Contractor." The supervisory obligations in the AIA's Standard
Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect are parallel. Id. at Document B141,
Article 1, Standard Form ofAgreement Between Owner and Architect, v. 3 The American
Institute of Architects, HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL PRACrIcE (1977).
'44 AA General Conditions, supra note 91, at Article 4.3.3.
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or by inspections, tests or approvals required or performed [by the
Architect or other] persons other than the Contractor. 45
In sum, the AIA documents attempt to make clear that the architect has
not been hired to oversee the details of the .contractor's work and that the
architect's inspections are not meant to supersede the contractor's duties.'"
145 Id.
'" Indeed, in response to judicial imposition of negligence liability, the AIA
documents often have been modified precisely to attempt to make this point clear. As the
prefatory remarks to the AMA General Conditions state:
In its current edition (Thirteenth Edition, August 1976) [the General
conditions] represent a consensus of leaders in the construction industry,
resulting from approximately 90 years of review, application, and testing in
practice and in the courts.
mhe Eighth Edition, published in 1961, resulted largely from the
construction industry's concern over the steadily increasing number of uncertain-
ties and disputes concerning liability and professional responsibility. [In the
Eighth Edition] ... the term "observation' was first used in place of "supervi-
sion" ....
The Ninth Edition, issued in 1963, clarified the status and responsibilities
of the Architect during the Construction Phase of the Project, particularly with
respect to the oft-misused term "supervision," due to the difficulties of non-
architects in understanding the limited nature of the Architect's supervisory
function, despite a clear definition of the term in the documents.
The Tenth Edition, in 1966, constituted the largest reorganization ... [M{ew
definitions were added ... [and] Contractor's responsibilities for detailed
supervision of the Work, for construction means, methods, techniques,
sequences and procedures, and for safety were established ...
During three years of experience in using the Eleventh Edition, and as a
result of dehlberations with construction industry representatives and legal
counsel and insurance counsel, certain desirable improvements became apparent
.... Due to legal interpretations which subjected the Architect to unwarranted
liability, the provision which allowed the Architect to stop the Work was
deleted [in the new edition]. This provision had been intended to enable the
Architect to prevent the construction of further defective Work. [However,]
[t]he courts interpreted it as placing a duty on the Architect to anticipate defects
in construction which might subsequently result in injury, and to use the power
to stop the Work to prevent possible injuries.
The Twelfth Edition had a fill four years of use prior to the start of review
proceedings by AIA's Documents Board in preparation for the Thirteenth
Edition. The initial intent was to modify only those provisions which experience
and use indicated were necessary, including provisions affected by court
decisions ....
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C. The Standard of Architectural Performance
When the contractor is allowed to rely on the architect, should it only
be so long as the architect takes due care? That is, when the architect
insures, should it be against negligent failure, or just failure?
If the architect is liable only for her negligence, she insures against
error only to the point at which she has failed to take due care. Because
strict liability for error will not result in more care by the architect,147
the question becomes who should insure against errors that cannot be
avoided cost effectively. 4 '
Placing liability on the architect for all errors has a significant
advantage: it eliminates disputes over the quality of the architect's
performance. Negligence liability imports a vague standard of
architectural care. To insure against an architect's negligence (as opposed
simply to an architect's errors) is costly, because defining the scope of
insurance is difficult. Ceteris paribus, the clearer the terms of the
obligation, the lower the costs of arguing over its reach."4  The
ambiguity reduces the benefits of the insurance to the contractor, while
the indeterminate scope of the duty to use due care invites litigation and
thereby increases the owner's costs. As a result, sensible owners may well
prefer the architect to insure against all errors, period, and not just against
negligent error." '
This ultimately devolved into a total and major update of the document
within the existing framework.
1 AMlmcAN INST. OF ARCHITECTS, HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICF, ch. 13,
Preface to General Conditions to the Contract of Construction, at 3-4 (1977).
147 See LANDEs & POSNER, supra note 100, at 64-65.
" This decision is independent from the decision whether to compensate the
contractor for delay damages. Negligence would be a very clumsy way of addressing the
delay damages issue.
149 See generally Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in READINGS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF CONTRAcr LAW (Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1989) (discussing the social
costs of negotiations).
15 For these reasons, the owner may not want to relieve the architect from liability,
even in situations in which the contractor should have discovered the error. It seems very
unlikely, however, that the architect could take less care because it would not face
liability for its most egregious errors. Nevertheless, an owner must decide whether giving
the contractor an incentive to report obvious architectural errors is sufficiently worthwhile
to justify injecting uncertainty over the scope of the architect's obligation. One factor to
consider would be the contractor's other incentives to identify error, such as a "no damage
for delay" clause.
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Courts have found that tort liability does not incorporate contractual
standards of care. In one example, a federal district court expressly held
that a supervising engineer owed a contractor a duty to use "care and
competence commensurate with the standards of his profession in
obtaining and communicating information for the guidance of" the
contractor.' The court rejected the suggestion that the engineer should
be bound, vis a vis the contractor, to the higher standard of care to which
the engineer was bound by its contract with the owner.52
If the contractor is permitted to rely on a certain level of architectural
competence, such competence should, at the least, be the level of care set
out in the contract. This would certainly be the result that sensible
contracting parties would reach. An owner would not explicitly allow a
contractor to rely on the architect and simultaneously temper that reliance
by reference to a level of architectural care lower than the level specified
in the owner-architect contract, for then the owner could not extract as
much of a discount from the contractor, even though the owner had
already paid the architect for the higher quality services. Additionally,
disputes would be muddied, because the architect's performance would
have to be judged by two different standards of performance (often within
a single lawsuit), depending upon the identity of the claimant.
D. Common Arguments in Favor of Negligence Liability
Two arguments are typically made in support of allowing a direct
action by a contractor against an architect even absent an express
The AIA contracts state that the contractor is not liable for defects in the plans,
specifications, or other design work, but must report discovered error.
The Contractor shall carefully study and compare the Contract Documents
and shall at once report to the Architect any error, inconsistency or omission he
may discover. The Contractor shall not be liable to the Owner or the Architect
for any damage resulting from any such errors, inconsistencies or omissions in
the Contract Documents.
ARl General Conditions, supra note 91, at Article 4.2.1.
. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Util. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376, 394 (S.D. Iowa
1973) (citing Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969), which held that an
accountant was liable in negligence to a third party, who the accountant knew would rely
on the accountant's work).
1 Id.; see also E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Texas, 551 F.2d 1026,
1032 n.14 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding a tort duty independent of the contractual standard of
care); Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496, 502 (Ala.
1984) (stating "that contracts may impose greater or lesser degrees of responsibility and
that third parties are generally not entitled to benefit from contract standards which differ
from the standard of care generally applicable in negligence actions").
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contractual provision providing for one: simplifying litigation and owner
insolvency. In theory, to allow the contractor to sue the architect could
eliminate an unnecessary party from the claim. For example, if the owner
warranted the plans and specifications to the contractor, and the architect
gave the same warranty to the owner, allowing the contractor to sue the
architect directly would be simpler than channeling the claim through the
owner To the extent that simplifying litigation is the goal, however,
negligence liability is a cumbersome mechanism. The owner, no doubt
the party most interested in simplifying the matter by stepping out of it,
can assign its rights against the architect to the contractor, either in the
owner-contractor contract or at some later time. Moreover, negligence
liability only presents the possibility of simplified litigation. The
contractor can still sue the owner in contract, and for strategic reasons
may choose to do so, thus keeping all three parties involved. Likewise,
the contractor's claim against the architect may be only a relatively small
part of a larger dispute over the project to which the owner, architect, and
contractor are parties."
Owner insolvency is, in effect, a case where postcontracting
assignment may not be available. The issue, then, is whether the law
should protect contractors who fail to protect themselves. If an owner
pays for a warranty from the architect and gives one to the contractor,
and neither the architect nor the contractor priced the risk of owner
insolvency into their contracts, some inequity would exist as between the
architect and the contractor." The prevalence of mechanics' lien laws,
however, makes owner insolvency something less than an acute prob-
"n See Jones, supra note 121, at 1096 (stating that channeling claims through the
owner is desirable). On the broader subject of channeling claims for purely economic loss,
one commentator states:
[under] common-law economic-loss doctrines[,] ... both recovery and
nonrecovery for pure economic loss c[an] be explained by balancing the value
of recovery, on the one hand, and both expected litigation and channeling costs
on the other. Recovery is denied when expected litigation costs exceed the
expected value of such recovery or the costs of channeling the losses through
the party incurring physical damage.
Rizzo, supra note 6, at 310 (1982).
l1 Indeed, in such cases negligence liability actually complicates litigation by, among
other things, confusing the parties' contractual duties and liabilities and intejecting a
fault-based standard of architectural care.
'" If, however, the parties took this risk into account when contracting, then they will
have been fully compensated, ex ante.
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lem,"s and doctrinal alternatives' again make negligence liability a
blunt tool.ss
IV. CONCLUDiNG REMAKS
A contractor who seeks to recover purely economic loss caused by an
architect's mistakes should be confined to contract remedies. A tort action
in negligence against the architect is unnecessary. Unlike most personal
injury cases, contract solutions for economic loss provide fully satisfacto-
ry remedial alternatives.
Indeed, the claims recognized in Rogers & Rogers and Moyer present
a core case for the application of the economic loss rule. Simply put, the
policies underlying the general prohibition against recovery of purely
economic loss in negligence or products liability cases speak most
directly to situations where the loss is confined to a small group whose
relations are governed by extensive written contracts.
If contract remedies are adequate and negligence remedies are
unnecessary, why then did the contractors seek tort relief in Rogers &
Rogers and Moyer? The answer, no doubt, lies in the difference between
this Article's conclusion that, ex ante, negligence remedies are unneces-
sary and the strategy of litigants, ox post, to seek recovery from any
possible source. Perhaps the contractors wanted to maintain friendly
owner-contractor relations.'59 Or, perhaps their lawyers simply felt
better about their skills in presenting tort claims."w Or, perhaps most
156 See SIEGfrIED, supra note 5, at 61-80.
"' For example, the law could fashion a nanw rule of constructive assignment in
insolvency cases, or fashion a broader constructive assignment of the owner's contract
rights, or deem the contractor a third-party beneficiary to the owner's contract with the
architect. While there is substantial authority opposed to the third-party beneficiary theory,
e.g. Moyer, 285 So. 2d 397, 402-03 (Fla. 1973), there is also substantial authority against
negligence recovery for pure economic loss. Any of these alternative rules would entail
less sweeping change than importing negligence principles. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 6,
at 43-44 (arguing that the third-party beneficiary doctrine, not negligence, provides a
better framework for analyzing the J'Aire case, in which a contractor's late completion of
a remodeling project injured the owner's tenant). See supra note 65 for a sketch of the
J'A4ire case.
See Goldberg, supra note 42, at 312.
" In the J'Aire case, for example, "the tenant's lawyer told the court [that] the tenant
did not wish to upset its friendly relations with the building owner" by pressing its claim
against the owner instead of the contractor. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 41; see supra
note 65 for a description of the J'Aire case.
160 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 43.
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likely, they wished to avoid a recovery-limiting contract provision, like
a "no damage for delay" clause.'
The suspect nature of the reasons for seeking tort relief highlights the
problems that importing negligence principles can cause. Negligence
liability can force owners to underwrite the costs of construction delays
when efficient incentives or the parties' contracts would place those costs
on the contractor. In addition, liability for negligent supervision can give
the architect a job that it didn't undertake and relieve the contractor of
one that it did. Thus, negligence liability can result in the rewriting of the
parties' bargain in favor of the contractor, but against the short-term
interests of the architect (who is liable) and the owner (whose agent now
faces conflicting obligations), and the long-term interests of everyone
(who now encounter inflated construction costs). Finally, the often
contentious issue of negligence will further complicate already complex
construction disputes.
See supra note 122.
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